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IN DENIAL: THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
PREPARING FOR DEATH 
Barbara A. Noah 
Only approximately 20% of Americans have engaged in any form of advance care 
planning and, even among older Americans, the process frequently is delayed until an 
acute illness provides sufficient pressure to act. End of life law, though flawed, offers 
some opportunity to express individual values and preferences via advance directives 
of various kinds in order to prepare for death before it is imminent. Yet many people 
avoid making these preparations because the thought of death is uncomfortable to 
confront. This Article considers the utility of existing law in preventing and 
resolving end of life disputes and avoiding over-utilization of life-prolonging 
technology and the law's inevitable failure to address complex issues concerning 
quality of life and communication about this inevitable but usually unpredictable 
event. 
The so-called technological imperative and the cultural admiration of those who 
"fight" and "do everything" to defeat illness have created an atmosphere in which 
physicians and patients often feel complementarily reluctant to engage in thoughtful 
discussions about the patient's values, preferences, and concerns or, worse, even to 
acknowledge openly the fact of the patient's dying. In addition, the presumption in 
favor of continued treatment for patients who have lost decisional capacity has created 
a situation in which patients are frequently subjected to multiple therapeutic and life­
supportive technologies that they would not wish for if they could make the choice. 
This lacuna ofunconsidered choices suggests a significant need for formal expressions 
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of end of life preferences, or at least serious conversation with family and health care 
providers about one's preferences. The law allows individuals to express their 
preferences on these matters, but creates little incentive to do so. 
As other commentators have noted, advance directives rarely resolve end of life 
disputes-these commentators have therefore suggested abandoning efforts to 
encourage the utilization of advance directives. There is, however, a compelling 
argument in favor of continuing and expanding the practice-namely, the inherent 
and immediate benefit to the individual of carefully and systematically thinking about 
and executing an advance directive or, at least, discussing preferences with a health 
care proxy. Laws encouraging advance directives provide a structural context in 
which individuals can acknowledge their mortality and make the effort to consider and 
articulate to themselves and others their values and preferences, resulting in much 
potential benefit to themselves, their families and their health care providers, not only 
at the end of life but throughout life. Regularizing this practice throughout adulthood 
may gradually reduce the impact of the technology juggernaut on the dying process. 
This Article concludes by examining the ways in which end of life law and the medical 
education system might be reformed to promote individual reflection and 
conversations between patients and physicians in order to prepare for death. 
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I. 	 Introduction 
End of life law, though flawed, offers some 
opportunity to express one's values and preferences via advance 
directives, health care proxies, and other such mechanisms, in order to 
prepare for death before it is imminent. Yet many people avoid the 
thinking process that is necessary to make these preparations because 
the thought of death is uncomfortable to confront. Most decide, 
consciously or unconsciously, not to decide. If the decision not to 
decide is the result of a voluntary and considered choice to accept 
mortality by relinquishing attempts to exert control over death and 
the dying process, then perhaps all is well, at least for the dying 
individual, though the medical technology juggernaut may result in 
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an undesirable prolongation of the process. If, however, the non­
decision arises out of a reluctance and fear to confront death, then the 
non-deciders do themselves a disservice, not only at the time of death, 
but throughout the life that precedes it. 
Modern medical technology has brought to a boil matters which 
have simmered in the collective human consciousness for many cen­
turies. Beginning in the mid to late nineteenth century, dying was 
transformed from an accepted, albeit generally unwelcome, life pas­
sage to a medical crisis with the resultant medicalization of the death 
bed. 1 Around the middle of the nineteenth century, "[t]he most ap­
parent manifestation of the medicalization of death took place when 
the doctor replaced the priest as master of ceremonies."
2 
Before then, 
it was common for physicians to leave their dying patients in the care 
of family members and clergy when they could no longer offer any 
useful treatment. By the mid-1800s, expectations and practices 
changed and physicians often remained with their dying patients un­
til the end. Although this change in practice predated any new ability 
to treat dying patients, cultural attitudes toward the death bed were 
shifting. Despite their inability to provide any curative care, physi­
cians began to believe that they "had a responsibility to hold out 
some, even if very limited, course of action to the dying patient, to 
help her overcome a sense of helplessness." 
3 
Well into the twentieth· century, the advent of modern life­
supportive technologies and therapies enabled physicians to keep pa­
tients alive when their bodies would otherwise succumb to their un­
1. Shai Lavi, How Dying Became a "Life Crisis," 137 DAEDALUS 57, 58 (2008); 
see also ELIZABETH KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 19-20 (1969); Ivan Illich, 
Death Undefeated, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 1652, 1652 (1995) (observing "how difficult med­
icalisation made the task of family, friends, or chaplain: to arouse the dying per­
son's willingness to accept the inevitable, to find strength in the beauty of memo­
ries, and to take leave of this world."). 
2. Lavi, supra note 1, at 61. 
3. Id. As Joan Didion also has observed, modern death differs tremendously 
from that of a century ago. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
the act of dying had not yet been professionalized. It did not typically 
involve hospitals .... At the time [Emily Post] undertook her book of 
etiquette, there would have been few American households un­
touched by the influenza pandemic of 1918. Death was up close, at 
home. The average adult was expected to deal competently, and also 
sensitively, with its aftermath. 
JOAN DIDION, THE YEAR OF MAGICAL THINKING 60-61 (2005). The same is true, 
though more recently, with the medicalization of the process of childbirth. 
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derlying disease, injury, or disability.4 When life-sustaining technolo­
gies are used to assist a patient through a difficult illness or injury and 
return to health, there is rarely any conflict about their appropriate­
ness. When, however, a patient's chronic or acute illness has pro­
gressed to the point where there is no hope of cure or even improve­
ment, the use of these technologies in a situation that merely prolongs 
dying poses complex questions of ethical futility, not to mention wise 
use of limited medical resources.5 It is in such situations that conflict 
arises as, for example, the protracted legal dispute and public debate 
over the life and death of Theresa Schiavo so painfully illustrated.6 In 
such cases, the law requires that families, health care providers and, 
sometimes, courts attempt to ascertain the wishes of the dying patient 
regarding life-prolonging measures in order to carry out the patient's 
autonomous choices.7 
But the medicalization of dying has created more than just co­
nundrums about the appropriate use of medical technology. The em­
phasis on technology as the primary mechanism of medical care has 
gradually supplanted, or at least marginalized, other fundamental as­
pects of caregiving, such as communication and spending time with 
grieving patients and their families. Physicians lament the lost art of 
caregiving as the technology of medicine takes over and leaves little 
time for addressing each patient's emotional needs.8 Many patients­
experiencing fear and confusion about the nature of their disease or 
injury and its treatment, or simply sensing that their physicians are 
4. See Lavi, supra note 1, at 59 ("The growing use of antibiotics, surgery, and 
other technological advances, including life-sustaining machinery, had trans­
formed mortality statistics. But extending life had the unintended but inevitable 
consequence of prolonging dying and suffering."). 
5. As commentators have observed, it is paradoxical that the ever-increasing 
technological ability to sustain life has led to significant support for physician­
assisted suicide. See Charles J. Sabatino, Reflections on the Meaning of Care, 6 
NURSING ETHICS 374, 377 (1999). 
6. See Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo 
Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 107-34 (2005) [hereinafter Politicizing the End 
of Life]; Barbara A. Noah, The Role of Religion in the Schiavo Controversy, 6 HOUSTON 
J. HEALTHL. &POL'Y 319,319-46 (2006) [hereinafter Role ofReligion]. 
7. See infra notes 21-48 and accompanying text. 
8. See Arthur Kleinman, Forum: On Caregiving, HARV. MAG. July-Aug. 2010 
at 29 ("If the ancient Chinese perception is right that we are not born fully human, 
but only become so as we cultivate ourselves and our relations with others-and 
that we must do so in a threatening world where things often go terribly wrong 
and where what we are able to control is very limited-then caregiving is one of 
those relationships and practices of self-cultivation that make us, even as we expe­
rience our limits and failures, more human."). 
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pressed for time-hesitate to ask questions or to express their sense of 
despair or fear. 9 In this era of highly technological medical care, phy­
sicians and patients often feel complementarily reluctant to engage in 
thoughtful discussions about the patient's values, preferences, and 
concerns or, worse, even to acknowledge openly the fact of the pa­
t . ' d . 101ent s ymg. 
Modern medical technology has created a lacuna of end of life 
dilemmas, which have triggered a need for legal intervention in end 
of life decision making (including an important role for advance direc­
tives or, at least, serious conversations with family and health care 
providers about individual preferences in these matters). 11 In an op­
timal situation, there would be no need for law except to acknowledge 
and defend the presumption of individual choice. 12 In fact, the law of 
decision making at the end of life is, in a broad sense, well settled.13 
Nevertheless, because patients often do not or cannot choose, conflicts 
about the use of technologies at the end of life do arise and these con­
flicts take a substantial toll on families, health care providers, and so­
ciety more broadly. 
To avoid such conflicts (and their accompanying negative im­
pact on end of life care, loved ones, health care providers, and societal 
costs), individuals can "practice death"-that is, acknowledge the cer­
tainty of death, make and articulate choices about end of life prefer­
ences early in adulthood, discuss their preferences with relevant fami­
ly members, and revisit these choices on a regular basis via some form 
9. Id. at 25 (explaining that "[t]he structure of training and of service delivery 
discourages and even disables the art."). 
10. See Timothy E. Quill, Initiating End-of-Life Discussions with Seriously Ill Pa­
tients: Addressing the "Elephant in the Room," 284 JAMA 2502, 2503 (2000). 
11. The same medical technology also created a need for the law to define 
"death" for various legal and medical purposes (homicide, estates and trusts law, 
organ harvesting, and more). See A Defimtion of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 
205 JAMA 85 (1968); see also Roger N. Rosenberg, Consciousness, Coma, and Brain 
Death-2009, 301 JAMA 1172, 1173 (2009) (explaining that in the last twenty years, 
permanent vegetative state and minimal consciousness have been further defined 
as separate from coma and brain death); Seema K. Shah & Franklin G. Miller, Can 
We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions in the Determination of Death, 36 AM. J. L. MED. 
540, 541 (2010). 
12. There are also good arguments for placing some limits on individual au­
tonomy, though this discussion is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Alex­
ander McCall Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23 
(1997). 
13. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. 
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of advance care planning document or proxy. 14 For a variety of rea­
sons, many individuals in our society appear unwilling to do so, even 
though (in the current system) advance planning is crucial to preserve 
individual choice should a patient lose decisional capacity. At the 
same time, physicians have an obligation to encourage such conversa­
tions and to provide a frank and full picture of the patient's situation 
so that the conversation reflects the medical reality. The act of consid­
ering and discussing end of life choices, whether via a formal docu­
ment or conversations with family members and physicians, will do 
more to prevent end of life conflicts and over-utilization of life­
sustaining technology than any new or revised statute. 
To be fair, while those who espouse advance care planning fre­
quently argue that such preparations often would avoid much grief 
for all those involved, this is not invariably true. Commentary on the 
Schiavo case bemoaned the fact that Theresa Schiavo had not complet­
ed an advance directive indicating her preferences about health care 
should she lose decisional capacity. 15 In retrospect, it is doubtful that 
an advance directive would have made much difference in Theresa 
Schiavo's case16 because it became a cause celebre in the culture wars. 17 
But, in many cases, advance care planning can help indicate that the 
14. Advance care planning documents (also sometimes referred to collectively 
as "individual instructions for health care") include advance directives, values his­
tory forms, do-not-resuscitate orders, appointments of health care proxy decision 
makers, and POLST (Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment) and related 
documents. Depending on the law of the state in which it was executed, an ad­
vance directive may apply only when a patient is terminally ill, or it may also ap­
ply to patients in persistent vegetative states, irreversible coma, or other "non­
terminal" conditions. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS 294-95 (6th ed. 2008). 
15. See, e.g., Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling the Settled, 37 LOY. U. 
CHIC. L.J. 297, 315 (2006) (explaining that if Theresa Schiavo had executed a living 
will "clearly expressing a desire not to continue feeding in a permanent vegetative 
state, that might have sufficed to overcome the deference to [a] proxy's decision to 
continue treatment, but mere oral evidence would unlikely have been enough."). 
For background on the events of the Schiavo dispute, see Role of Religion, supra 
note 6 at 320-29. 
16. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Those who sought to keep 
Theresa alive would have argued that she had not anticipated the particular cir­
cumstances that she found herself in (permanent unconsciousness but not actively 
dying) or that, as a good Catholic, she would defer to the papal declaration de­
nouncing the withdrawal of artificial nutrition from patients such as herself. See 
Role of Religion, supra note 6 at 339-40 (describing and discussing the papal pro­
nouncement that artificial nourishment constitutes "minimal care" for the patient 
and that death by starvation from its withdrawal would be "euthanasia by omis­
sion"). 
17. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
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patient has given some thought to end of life issues. In its absence, 
the default position of continuing care may do as much harm as good, 
and therefore deserves careful scrutiny. 
The Schiavo case certainly did not end the collective struggle 
with decision making for incapacitated patients, particularly those 
who are not terminally ill and actively dying. It therefore seems use­
ful to consider why such conflicts arise in the first place and why they 
are likely to recur in the future. First, at risk of stating the obvious, in 
disputes or public debate over decision making for incapacitated pa­
tients, we often fail to acknowledge societal discomfort with the sub­
jects of death and dying. Second, a major cause of disputes is confu­
sion-not only about how to answer the question of what a 
decisionally incapacitated person would choose-but more funda­
mentally about whether this is the question we should be asking in 
the first place. 18 The end of life laws in the United States do little to 
address this confusion. End of life disputes arise from a cluster of cul­
tural issues-including a default position in favor of the utilization of 
technology, discomfort with conversations about death and dying, 
and the influence of the pro-life culture wars. Ultimately, however, 
no amount of legislation can serve to cajole or compel individuals to 
confront these issues. 
This Article considers the utility of existing law in preventing 
and resolving end of life disputes and avoiding over-utilization of life­
prolonging technology. 19 It also examines the law's inevitable failure 
to address complex issues concerning quality of life, communication 
about death, and the unwillingness of many individuals to 
acknowledge the reality of mortality, and to plan for that unavoidable 
but usually unpredictable event. As other commentators have noted, 
advance directives rarely resolve end of life disputes-therefore they 
have suggested abandoning efforts to encourage the utilization of ad­
vance directives.20 There is, however, a compelling argument in favor 
18. See generally Daniel Brudney, Choosing for Another: Beyond Autonomy and 
Best Interests, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 31 (discussing differences 
among concepts of autonomy, self-determination, and authenticity in making de­
cisions for patients who have lost decisional capacity). 
19. The next paper in this series considers an alternative to the current ap­
proach, which focuses so heavily on patient autonomy as the principle to resolve 
end of life disputes. See Barbara A. Noah, Medical Autonomy and Pragmatism (forth­
coming 2013) (manuscript on file with author). 
20. See, e.g., Angela Fager lin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Liv­
ing Will, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 31 ("In an attempt to extend 
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of continuing and expanding the practice-namely, the inherent and 
immediate benefit to the individual of thinking about and executing 
an advance directive or discussing preferences with a health care 
proxy. Laws encouraging advance directives provide a template 
through which individuals can make an effort to consider and articu­
late to themselves and others their values and preferences. In doing 
so, they provide a structural context in which individuals can address 
their mortality, resulting in much potential benefit to themselves, their 
families and their health care providers, not only at the end of life but 
throughout life. This Article ends with an examination of the ways in 
which end of life law and the medical education system might be re­
formed to promote individual reflection and conversations between 
patients and physicians in order to prepare for death. 
II. 	 Death and Dying in the Post-Modern (Legal) World 
In the United States, we have a vast and multi-layered legal in­
strumentarium designed to articulate and protect our health care deci­
sion making rights through a combination of federal and state statutes 
and judicial decisions. It is well settled that end of life law in the 
United States protects an individual's right of decision making about 
health care (including the right to ignore the topic), though it does lit­
tle to promote the making of those decisions. Virtually every state has 
enacted statutes permitting (but not requiring) individuals to assert 
their wishes via some form of advance directive.
21 
patients' exercise of autonomy beyond their span of competence, resources have 
been lavished to make living wills routine and even universal. This policy has not 
produced results that recompense its costs, and it should therefore be re­
nounced."); John A. Robertson, Second Thoughts on Living Wills, HAsTINGS CENTER 
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 6-7 (acknowledging the benefits, at least superficially, of 
living wills, but questioning whether they actually provide valid guidance as to 
the later-incompetent patient's wishes and interests). 
21. In addition to laws dealing with advance directives, most states have en­
acted statutes that formally permit individuals to appoint a health care proxy deci­
sion maker via a durable power of attorney for health care decision making. A 
formally appointed health care proxy must make decisions either based on the pa­
tient's separately-executed advance directive, or if none is available, based on the 
patient's values and preferences as the proxy understands them. See Charles P. 
Sabatino, The Legal and Functional Status of the Medical Proxy: Suggestions for Statuto­
ry Reform, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 52, 58-59 (1999) (providing a summary of state 
provisions). Merely appointing a health care proxy, however, even a spouse, does 
not ensure that the parties have communicated with any specificity about prefer­
ences with regard to end of life care. See Sara M. Moorman et al., Do Older Adults 
Know Their Spouses' End-of-Life Treatment Preferences?, 31 REs. ON AGING 463 (2009) 
(finding that spouses as surrogate decision makers state their spouses' preferences 
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States clearly struggle with the issue of advance directives, their 
enforceability, and even their desirability. Some states expressly for­
bid requiring advance directives,
22 
but others have taken a variety of 
steps to encourage their citizens to complete an advance directive by 
simplifying the process and recognizing the validity of out of state 
documents.23 In recent years, some states have attempted to encour­
age health care providers to consult existing advance directives by 
creating registries that make these documents more easily accessible 
24to providers, especially in emergencies. Still other states have ex­
panded the contexts in which advance directives are applicable, in­
cluding legislation that recognizes the Physician Order for Life Sus­
taining Treatment (POLST) form, which allows patients to request that 
physicians withhold life-sustaining treatments and less aggressive in­
terventions such as antibiotics, and also includes patient preferences 
for resuscitation, artificial nutrition and hydration, and hospital trans­
fer.25 
incorrectly in end of life scenarios 13% of the time with respect to cognitive im­
pairment and 26% of the time with respect to pain management); David Shalowitz 
et al., The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 
495 (2006) (finding that surrogate decision makers incorrectly predicted patients' 
preferences in one-third of cases studied). 
22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a-580e West, Westlaw through 
the 2012 Feb. Regular Session and June 12 Special Session (2012) (prohibiting the 
requirement of an advance directive). 
23. For example, North Carolina's statute explicitly recognizes advance direc­
tives created in other states as long as they were valid pursuant to the law of the 
state where they were created. See N.C.G.S. § 90-321(1) (2012) and N.C.G.S. § 32A­
24(d) (2012); see also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 450b.400-590 (2012) (requiring advance di­
rectives that conform to other states' laws to be upheld in Nevada); UTAH CODE §§ 
75-2a-104, 121 (2012) (simplifying the process by allowing for written or oral ad­
vance directives and making a presumption of capacity). 
24. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.920-449.925 (2011) (establishing a registry 
of advance directives); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.666 (2011) (establishing a registry of 
advance directives and Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) 
forms); cf James Wallace & Norman A. Desbiens, Evaluation of a Labeling System to 
Indicate the Presence of an Advance Directive in a Hospital Medical Record, 16 INT'L J. 
FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 333, 334-35 (2004) (finding that only 3% of the stud­
ied inpatient population had an advance directive in their medical record and only 
46 of 121 medical records studied had a label indicating the presence of an ad­
vance directive elsewhere and that many of these labels were inaccurate); see also 
Thaddeaus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Advance Care Planning, 20 J. CLINICAL 
ETHICS 362, 365 (2009) (explaining that a total of eleven state legislatures have en­
acted legislation requiring an electronic registry to store health care directives in 
order to make these documents readily available to health care providers). 
25. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 39-4510 West, Westlaw through end of 2012 
2nd Reg. Session of the 61st Legis. (2012) (adding a POLST option); MD Health 
Gen. § 5-602 (adding a POLST option); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 90-21.17 (2012) (adding a 
POLST option); see also California POLST Form (2011), available at http:/ I 
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In addition to these state law efforts, commentators have urged 
the development of a simple and effective form that will comply with 
the legal requirements of all states?6 Most who favor reform agree 
that legislatures should design laws that make the execution of ad­
vance directives simple and affordable for their citizens.27 In addition 
to making the format readily available, legislatures should recognize 
the legal validity of directives that are executed in proper form with­
. f ~ out the assistance o an attorney. 
The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act provides a template for 
state laws relating to advance directives and durable powers of attor­
ney for health care decisions.29 It includes a suggested statutory form 
for advance directives but also encourages their completion by per­
mitting individual variations of form/0 by not requiring witnesses or 
notarization/1 and by making the advance directive valid regardless 
of when and where it was executed.32 In addition, a variety of federal 
laws have attempted to encourage individuals to formalize their end 
of life preferences, all with little success.33 
www.capolst.org/documents/CAPOLSTform2011 v13web_005.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2013). For more discussion of the utility of POLSTs, see generally Susan 
E. Hickman, et al., The POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment) Para­
digm to Improve End-of-Life Care: Potential State Legal Barriers to Implementation, 36 J. 
L. MED. & ETHICS 119 (2008); Susan E. Hickman et al., Use of the Physician Orders for 
Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) Paradigm Program in the Hospice Setting, 12 J. 
PALLIATIVE MED. 133, 133-41 (2010). 
26. Some suggest that the "Five Wishes" document accomplishes this goal. 
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 298. The "Five Wishes" document is available 
at Five Wishes, AGING WITH DIGNITY, www.agingwithdignity.org/five-wishes.php 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
27. See, e.g., Dorothy D. Nachman, Living Wills: Is It Time to Pull the Plug?, 18 
ELDER L.J. 289,317-18 (2011) (describing a U.S. Senate bill which includes funding 
of legal services for advance care planning for low-income people and expands the 
portability of validly-executed advance directives from state to state). 
28. Although requiring witnesses to the executor's signature makes sense to 
reduce the risk of fraud, there seems to be little reason to require the services of a 
notary public to validate these documents. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS 
ACT (1993), available at http:/ /www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/health%20 
care%20decisions/uhcda_final_93.pdf ("An advance health-care directive is valid 
for purposes of this [Act] if it complies with this [Act], regardless of when or 
where executed or communicated."). 
29. See id. at § 2(h). As of this writing, some version of this Act has been 
adopted in approximately six states. See id. (citing legislative factsheet). 
30. See id. at§ 4. 
31. Id. at§ 2, § 4 and cmts. (explaining that witness signatures are optional). 
32. Id. at§ 2(h). 
33. For example, the Patient Self-Determination Act, has had very limited ef­
fectiveness in increasing the rate at which adults complete advance directives. See 
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELF­
DETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
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Finally, judicial decisions at the state and federal level have add­
ed a further common law layer to the state statutes by resolving indi­
vidual disputes about end of life care. Many of these disputes involve 
uncertainty about the quality or quantity of evidence of a now­
incompetent patient's assumed wishes, either because the patient has 
no advance directive/
4 
or a family member is disputing the appropri­
ateness of a health care proxy decision maker, or the relevance of an 
advance directive.35 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has ad­
dressed issues surrounding end of life choices on multiple occasions, 
though mainly to opine in one form or another that these are matters 
best left to the states for regulation.36 
Ultimately, as the discussion that follows will illustrate, it seems 
to be of little practical importance what the law says about advance 
directives beyond acknowledging their legal validity when they exist. 
These directives and related attempts to announce patient preferences 
(such as documents appointing health care proxies) are frequently in­
accessible at key decision-making points, irrelevant or insufficiently 
specific to address the actual medical decision at hand, overruled by 
family members, or ignored by health care providers. Despite all of 
these pitfalls, however, the process of making an advance directive 
can provide important ancillary benefits-which not only accrue di­
rectly for the individual and his or her loved ones, but also more indi­
rectly for health care providers and society. 
Our legal rights of decision-making are grounded in the ethical 
principle of autonomy and include the right to refuse treatment even 
if one is not terminally ill.37 These rights also include the right tore-
BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 2 (1995) (concluding that "advance directives have 
been advocated more than they have been used" and that "in general, only 10 to 25 
percent of Americans have documented their end of life choices or appointed a 
health care agent."); see also Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 20, at 32 (commenting 
on the empirical studies that demonstrate the PSDA's lack of effectiveness). 
34. See, e.g., In re Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
35. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176 (2001) (disputing, 
among other things, whether it was appropriate for the patient's husband to con­
tinue to serve as her surrogate decision-maker). Other disputes concern the best 
interests of never-capacitated patients such as infants. See, e.g., In re Baby "K.", 16 
F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). 
36. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); 
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
37. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1135 (1986) ("Peti­
tioner sought to enforce only a right which was exclusively hers and over which 
neither the medical profession nor the judiciary have any veto power. The trial 
court could but recognize and protect her exercise of that right."). 
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fuse treatment when terminally ill, the right to continue receiving life­
prolonging treatment even when terminally ill (though this value be­
comes subject to dispute if the treatment appears "futile"), and, in 
some states, the right to hasten one's death with the assistance of a 
0 0 
phys1c1an.38 
Advance directives, the orthodox argument goes, promote au­
tonomy because they formalize an individual's wishes about treat­
ment choices and serve as a guide to the treating physician and the 
family about how to proceed if the individual is unable to speak for 
herself. These documents can give patients who complete them a 
sense of control over their health care, should they lose decisional ca­
pacity.39 In multiple respects, this sense of control is an illusion. First, 
these documents may have limited application under state law.40 Sec­
ond, they are not necessarily accurate predictors of what an individual 
would really choose under the particular circumstances when deci­
sionally-incapacitated by illness.41 Furthermore, advance directives 
are seldom made and seldom followed.42 
In fact, advance directives and the laws which authorize them 
may protect patient autonomy (i.e. they can announce a patient's choice 
to accept or reject cardiopulmonary resuscitation, for example, or to 
decline artificial nutrition or ventilation), but they do little to promote 
authenticity in decision making. Individuals frequently do not know 
what they want, what choices are theirs, or how to articulate their 
" 38. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act of 1994, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-995 
(2011); Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.245 (2012); Bax­
ter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211 (2009). 
39. See Robertson, supra note 20 (acknowledging the benefits, at least superfi­
cially, of living wills, but questioning whether they actually provide valid guid­
ance as to the later-incompetent patient's wishes and interests). 
40. States frequently limit applicability of advance directives to terminal ill­
ness, leaving patients who suffer from chronic and debilitating disease with more 
limited options, such as the appointment of a health care proxy. See id. at 6. 
41. See id. at 8 (noting that those who execute advance directives are "rare­
ly ... told that the directive they make reflects their current interests and may not 
be a good indicator of their interests as an incompetent patient."); see also Fagerlin 
& Schneider, supra note 20, at 33 (arguing that people will have difficulty predict­
ing their preferences in advance because they misunderstand illnesses and treat­
ments, think about their "choices" only superficially, and change their minds over 
time). 
42. See Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 20, at 32, 36 (noting that less than 20% 
of Americans have living wills, and studies suggest that living wills rarely influ­
ence the level of medical care; at least a quarter of patients with living wills receive 
care that is inconsistent with their instructions). 
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wishes.
43 
These are not the sorts of questions that can be answered in 
an attorney's office or hospital admissions desk with a few moments 
of reflection. These questions require far more contemplation and in 
more detail than one can achieve by simply ticking boxes on a one­
size-fits-all form. For confluence of autonomy and authenticity, it is 
the responsibility of each individual to think carefully about the vari­
ous possible scenarios 44 and to make some decisions about what sort 
of care the individual wishes to have and what life-prolonging 
measures that person might wish to avoid. 
Diligently considering these future scenarios and discussing 
them in detail with family members may seem unappealing to many 
people. An authentic decision requires a reasonably detailed under­
standing of the relevant options and their projected impact on the pa­
tient's prognosis and quality of life in the context of the patient's val­
ues and goals. Even those individuals who do confront these 
questions and document their wishes risk being influenced, con­
sciously or unconsciously, by family and societal expectations about 
what they should choose and when. Even so, advance care planning, 
with all of its flaws in content and implementation, helps provide 
guidance to family members and health care providers, and serves a 
salutary purpose for the individual who willingly takes on the task, 
preferably before serious illness or injury arises. 
The ethical principle of autonomy coexists in an uneasy detente 
with the ethical principle of beneficence, which requires that physi­
cians provide that care which is in their patients' best interests.45 
When a patient's wishes are unclear, defining "best interests" is often 
difficult. Ideally, when a patient can no longer articulate his wishes, 
the decision should center around whether continued treatment 
would be the patient's authentic choice-that is, the choice that re­
flects careful thought, self-knowledge, and reflection, and that 
43. Id. at 33-35 (noting the difficulty of predicting preferences for future un­
specified illnesses with unspecified treatments, adding that people do not under­
stand treatments well enough to make an informed choice, and usually cannot 
write clearly enough to express preferences in detail even if they understood 
them). 
44. Such scenarios might include, "what if I become mentally incapacitated?," 
"what if I become unable to care for myself?," "what if I develop a medical condi­
tion that leaves me in intractable pain or causes me to suffer from continuous 
shortness of breath?," and "what if I become permanently unconscious?". 
45. See JOHN C. FLETCHER, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL ETHICS 12 (2d 
ed. 1997) (describing beneficence as the "obligation to benefit patients ... and to 
further their welfare and interests"). 
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acknowledges the external influences that shape an individual's iden­
tity.46 Autonomy ideally means more than possessing a choice-it 
means exercising that choice in a meaningful way which reflects holis­
tically the patient's values, preferences, and beliefs within the context 
of her current, and evolving, life circumstances.47 Advance directives 
drafted with this goal in mind must, therefore, speak with specificity 
about the writer's instructions for care when he or she suffers from a 
self-defined "intolerable indignity" as a result of a medical condi­
tion.48 It requires the confrontation of death, its inevitability, and 
even, eventually, its possible desirability. 
The co-existence of principles of autonomy and beneficence cre­
ates disagreements about the futility of life-supportive medical tech­
nology, and these disputes are embedded into many end of life con­
flicts. Physicians, patients, or families may question whether and 
when further treatment or life-sustaining measures are no longer 
medically or ethically appropriate.
49 
New technologies also create 
new ethical dilemmas.50 The futility conundrum is obvious-futility 
46. For a thorough discussion of different perspectives on the meaning of au­
tonomy, see M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Autonomy: Coercion and Morality in Clinical 
Relationships, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 229, 276-91 (1996). 
47. See Brudney, supra note 18, at 33 (discussing the concept of autonomy as 
.self-determination and suggesting that focusing on the distinction between desire 
and choice is helpful in understanding autonomy-we desire certain things that 
we may choose not to act on). 
48. See Norman L. Cantor, Making Advance Directives Meaningful, 4 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL'Y & L. 629, 639--41 (1998) (discussing how a declarant can "effectively 
communicate the degree of deterioration at which death would, for that person, be 
preferable to continued existence."). 
49. Futility questions arise in two categories-questions of the subjective val­
ue of the medical intervention and questions about the probability that the medical 
intervention will be successful. See Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 
326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1561 (1992). 
50. In one recent case, a patient who had a left ventricular assist dev~ce 
(LVAD) implanted to supplement his heart's ability to circulate blood later re­
quested that the pump be shut off because he found life intolerable with his pro­
found disability. A bioethicist, commenting on the case, wrote that disabling the 
LVAD would be "tantamount to removing the patient's heart." See Rob Stein, 
Heart Pump Creates Life-Death Ethical Dilemmas, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2008, at Al. 
Such drastic statements perpetuate the misimpression that one has an ethical obli­
gation to stick with life-sustaining technologies once they are started. New brain 
imaging technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRl) pose 
different but equally vexing dilemmas. FMRl technology allows physicians to 
identify localized neural activity in the brain that was previously undetectable 
through observable patient responses. These scans have called into question the 
accuracy of diagnoses of permanent vegetative state, raising questions about the 
consequent appropriateness of withdrawal of life-sustaining measures from these 
patients. See J. Andrew Billings et al., Severe Brain Injury and the Subjective Life, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2010, at 17, 18-20. 
------------------------------
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is in the eye of the beholder, so that families, patients, and health care 
providers may fail to agree on an appropriate point to discontinue 
technological interventions. Without guidance about an individual 
patient's beliefs regarding continued life-supportive measures, it is 
difficult to know when to cease providing support to a person whose 
condition will not improve. In such circumstances, the U.S. health 
care system and its providers are reluctant to opine about an incapaci­
tated patient's best interests, and generally will revert to erring on the 
side of continued treatmene1 
With the evolution of life-supportive technologies and interven­
tions, we add to our arsenal for delaying death-we almost always 
can do something more. We have all heard grieving families assure 
others that "the doctors did everything they could." "Doing every­
thing" may help assuage feelings of helplessness on the part of fami­
lies and care givers, but it is not necessarily in the patient's best inter­
ests, nor does it necessarily reflect the patient's authentic choice.52 
One important aspect of the futility question concerns quality of life. 
Even if a treatment or technology extends life, should physicians pro­
vide it if the patient will experience no added benefit in the form of 
improved function? As a society, we experience serious discomfort 
when consid~ring quality of life as a factor in resolving disputes about 
the continuation of arguably futile care. Rather than address uncom­
fortable quality of life questions, however, we "err on the side of life" 
even when all sentience is permanently gone. 
As Schiavo and other cases of its type illustrate, many individuals 
take the position that our end-of-life laws should default on the side of 
continued treatment whenever a patient's choice or best interest is in 
dispute and decline to assess the quality of that life in doing so.53 Giv­
51. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (dis­
cussing the risks of an erroneous decision to withdraw life-support from a patient 
who lacks decisional capacity). 
52. Cf. Sean Palfrey, Daring to Practice Low-Cost Medicine in a High-Tech Era, 
NEW ENG. J. MED., at e21(1), e21(1) (2011), available at http:/ /www.nejm.org/ 
doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMpl101392?ssource=hcrc (commenting on the mistaken be­
lief that "'doing everything' is the best practice and the way to prevent harm"). 
53. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) ("[A] 
state may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a par­
ticular person may enjoy and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preserva­
tion of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of 
the individual."); Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 174 (Cal. 2001) (upholding 
a trial court decision to continue life-sustaining treatment despite a proxy decision 
maker's request to withdraw it because the proxy "offered no basis for such a find­
ing other than her own subjective judgment that the conservatee did not enjoy a 
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en that several opinion polls establish that the majority of people say 
they would prefer not to continue living in a permanent vegetative 
state}4 and given the astonishing amount of health care resources we 
use in the final months of our lives}5 why does the law presume that, 
when a patient's wishes are unknown, that patient would wish to con­
tinue treatment or life-supportive measures? Part of the answer is, of 
course, that keeping a patient alive "in error" is capable of correction 
in the future, should additional information about the patient's wishes 
or condition become available. Implicit in this "err on the side of life" 
mentality is an unwillingness to make quality of life assessments. A 
biologic view of life is a binary view-that a person is either "alive" or 
"dead." It fails to account for the range of intermediate levels of un­
consciousness or other sorts of disability or suffering in which a per­
son with decisional capacity might choose to forego additional life­
prolonging treatment. A purely biologic view of life certainly pre­
sents an easy to apply bright-line rule for courts. 56 But for persons to 
whom this approach is applied, the presumption in favor of continued 
treatment risks demeaning the individual or disregarding his prefer­
ences. 
Much of the commentary on the Schiavo case also noted the in­
appropriate influences of politics, religion, and the so-called "culture 
wars" on the resolution of this dispute. 57 During the final years before 
satisfactory quality of life and legally insufficient evidence to the effect that he 
would have wished to die"); In re Conservatorship of Helga M. Wanglie, No. PX­
91-283, Dist. Ct. Prob. Ct. Div. (Minn. 1989) (upholding the surrogate's request for 
continued treatment of the patient, who was in a persistent vegetative state and 
who died more than a year later of sepsis). 
54. See, e.g., Kelly Gullo, ed., Harris Interactive Health Care Poll, By a Near 
Four-to-One Margin, U.S. Adults Favor Not Taking Additional Steps to Prolong the Lives 
of Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State, Apr. 12, 2005 (copy on file with author); 
Lydia Saad, Americans Choose Death Over Vegetative State, GALLUP (Mar. 29, 2005), 
http: I I www.gallup.com/poll/15448I americans-choose-death-over-vegetative­
state.aspx. 
55. Cf Andrew Stern, Discussing End-of-Life Care Lowers Cost-U.S. Study, 
REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http:/ /www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/ 
idUSN06415881. 
56. Cf In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994) (resolving, on technical statuto­
ry grounds, a dispute about continued life supportive measures for an anence­
phalic infant and thus defaulting to protection of purely biologic life). 
57. See, e.g., George J. Annas, "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed by Ideology in 
the Political Debate Over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REV. 49 (2005); Kathy L. 
Cerminara, Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the Political Culture Wars in Schiavo, 
29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 279 (2007); Politicizing the End of Life, supra note 6, at 107; 
John A. Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)Significance, 35 STETSON L. REV. 101 (2005); 
Shepherd, supra note 15, at 297. 
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Theresa Schiavo died, there was an astonishing outpouring of pas­
sionate public sentiment (both supportive and condemnatory) at the 
court's decision to order the removal of her feeding tube.58 The dis­
pute over Theresa Schiavo's care provided a worst-case scenario for 
resolving an ethical conflict at the end of life. For politicians to im­
pose a presumption of continued life at all costs when it is inconsistent 
with the individual patient's preferences represents the worst kind of 
potential harm because the presumption, in many cases, will funda­
mentally violate principles of autonomy and beneficence. The Schiavo 
battle, which pitted political and religious conservatives against The­
resa's husband and the courts which had agreed with him that she 
would have chosen to forego continued life support, presented an un­
comfortable cultural irony: the pro-life religious organizations which 
battled to keep Theresa alive at all costs were keeping her, a commu­
nicant of the Catholic church, from achieving the peace that her faith 
promises. 
Choosing to "err on the side of life" as a default in order to avoid 
difficult conversations about quality of life has created a further ethi­
cal dilemma when coupled with broadly available medical technolo­
gies designed to sustain (biological) life. As a society, we are equally 
reluctant to consider explicitly or to discuss the cost of end of life care 
as we evaluate whether and when to cease life-supportive measures 
and therapeutic interventions. Although it is well documented that 
"one-third of expenses in the last year of life are spent in the final 
month ... with aggressive treatments in the final month accounting 
for 80 percent of those costs,"
59 
we often persist in "doing everything" 
and we celebrate those patients who "fight until the end." Similarly, 
we, as patients, frequently misunderstand or simply fail to receive sta­
tistical information about the potential success of various treatments 
and interventions.60 Statistical fallacies and unreasonable optimism 
lead patients to request and physicians to provide treatments that of­
fer little or no real promise of benefit and to discount the potential and 
often probable harms of such care. 61 Physicians also tend to over­
58. See Role of Religion, supra note 6, at 327-29 (describing last ditch efforts by 
interest groups and politicians to intervene in the Schiavo case). 
59. Stern, supra note 55. 
60. See Lynn A. Jansen et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Early-Phase Oncology Tri­
als, 33 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1, 2-7 (2011). 
61. See id. (concluding that, despite disclosures in informed consent about the 
early-stage cancer trials that they were enrolled in, patients tended to underesti­
mate the risks to themselves and overestimate the prospective benefit). 
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estimate the remaining life spans of seriously ill patients and to con­
vey prognosis in overly optimistic terms.62 
In fact, those patients who opt against therapeutic care in the 
face of severe chronic or terminal illness capture our attention and 
remind us that, sometimes, "doing everything" is not the best option 
for the patient, particularly when the adverse effects associated with 
treatment interfere with the patient's ability to enjoy life and provide 
little added time.63 Recent research confirms this conclusion. In a 
study of over 600 patients with advanced cancer, those patients who 
had end of life planning discussions with their physicians expended 
significantly less in health care costs in the final week of life and expe­
rienced less psychological and physical distress than those who did 
not discuss options with their physicians.
64 
Survival times between 
the two studied groups were equal on average, but higher health care 
spending at the end of life was associated with poorer quality of life in 
the last weeks before death.65 The study suggests "that increasing 
communication between patients and their physicians is associated 
62. See Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and Determinants 
of Error in Doctors' Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 469, 470-71 
(2000) (finding that, in predicting patients' remaining life expectancies, physicians 
were correct only 20% of the time and were over-optimistic 63% of the time and 
concluding that a closer doctor-patient relationship was associated with over­
optimistic predictions); see also Lisa I. Iezzoni et al., Survey Shows That at Least Some 
Physicians Are Not Always Open or Honest with Patients, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 383, 
383-88 (2012) (discussing a survey finding that one-in-ten physicians admitted to 
lying to a patient within the previous year and over half of those surveyed 
acknowledged that they had been unrealistically optimistic about a patient's prog­
nosis). 
63. See, e.g., PETER NOLL, IN THE FACE OF DEATH (Hans Noll Trans., 1989) 
(memoir detailing the author's decision to forego treatment for his bladder cancer 
in order to enjoy the remainder of his life without the burden of surgery's and ra­
diation's adverse effects); Amy Berman, Can Good Care Produce Bad Health?, 
HEALTH AGENDA (Jan. 11, 2011, 3:19 PM), http:/ /www.jhartfound.org/blog/ 
?p=2765 (discussing the author's decision not to seek treatment for her incurable 
stage IV breast cancer and the health care system's bias in favor of quantity rather 
than quality of life); Greg A. Sachs, Sometimes Dying Still Stings, 284 JAMA 2423, 
2423 (2000) (describing the death of a family member who opted for no cancer 
therapy and remained relatively well until the last two days of his life). 
64. Baohui Zhang et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associations 
With End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 480, 482-84 (2009) 
(finding that the average expenditure in the final week for patients who discussed 
end of life options with their physicians was $1,876 compared with $2,917 for those 
who did not). 
65. Id. (finding that patients did not experience any shortening of life as are­
sult of their decisions not to use intensive interventions such as ventilator sup­
port). 
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with better outcomes and with less expensive medical care."66 In fact, 
a growing body of evidence demonstrates that an emphasis on pallia­
tive care rather than aggressive therapy can improve patients' quality 
of life and even prolong survival. 67 Continuing aggressive care also 
poses risks of iatrogenic harm and additional pain or discomfort, often 
with no discernable off-setting physical benefit. Prolonging therapy 
when it offers only speculative benefit to the patient also needlessly 
increases costs in a health care system that is already straining to meet 
its obligations.68 
III. 	Denial of Mortality 
The willingness to engage in the kind of self-examination that is 
consistent with making advance directives depends in part on cultural 
factors, and in part on individual characteristics. For multiple reasons, 
we collectively have little appetite to address end of life issues before 
they arise in crisis form. The luxury of time, in the form of longer life 
spans, together with the promise of new therapies, has created the il­
lusion that there is time to procrastinate, to delay confronting mortali­
ty, perhaps even the hope of postponing death indefinitely. 
Until relatively recently, religious faith played a dominant role 
in the lives of many, if not most people. Most faiths, including Chris­
tianity, offer the promise of life after bodily death, at least if the indi­
vidual has taken the appropriate steps to achieve salvation. For those 
who have faith, the promise of salvation must surely provide some 
66. Id. at 487. Without regard to having end of life discussions with their 
physicians, the raw numbers of patients whose treatment preferences favored ag­
gressive interventions despite having advanced cancer were substantial: 158 out of 
603 patients stated that they valued life possible extension over comfort, 142 of the 
603 preferred ventilator use to extend life, and 122 of 603 stated that they preferred 
everything possible to extend life for a few days. Id. at 483 tbl.l. 
67. "Palliative care" refers to medical care intended to alleviate symptoms 
associated with illness, whatever the patient's prognosis. Such care may address 
pain, shortness of breath, insomnia, depression, nausea and lack of appetite, 
among other symptoms. See Lise M. Stevens, Palliative Care, 296 JAMA 1428, 1428 
(2006). 
68. It is well documented that one-third of medical expenses for the last year 
of life are spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and technologies 
in that final month account for nearly 80% of these costs. See Zhang, supra note 64, 
at 480. Moreover, 30% of Medicare dollars spent go to care for the 5% of Medicare 
beneficiaries who die each year. See Amber E. Barnato et al., Trends in Inpatient 
Treatment Intensity Among Medicare Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH 
SERVICES RES. 363, 363-64 (2004). 
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comfort in the face of death.69 Yet, Christianity also acknowledges the 
fear of death. 70 When society had all the rituals of organized religion, 
there was a pre-approved homogenous pathway, a set of instructions 
about how to live right and, finally, enter Paradise. Surprisingly, 
some recent research suggests that religious beliefs and traditions do 
not decrease fear of death,71 and a recent study in fact indicates that 
terminally ill patients who profess some sort of religious faith or prac­
tice are more likely than agnostic or atheist patients to seek aggressive 
care at the end of life. 72 
Today, in a more secular age, many individuals lack the frame­
work of religious belief to navigate the prospect death and dying. As 
one commentator noted, "[f]or the last two millennia at least, tight­
rope-walking theists have been keenly aware that, should the safety 
net of resurrection fail, there is nothing between them and the solid 
ground of mortalism."
73 
For many people, the pathway of organized 
religion no longer exists. With that safety net of formal religion gone, 
the fear of death may be grounded in the realization that it is up to the 
69. As Henry Scott Holland, Canon of St. Paul's Cathedral, wrote, "Death is 
nothing at all I I have only slipped away into the next room I I am I and you are 
you I Whatever we were to each other I That we are still I ... Life means all that 
it ever meant. I It is the same that it ever was I ... I am waiting for you I for an 
interval I Somewhere very near I Just around the corner I All is well." Henry 
Scott Holland, Death is Nothing at All, (published in Facts of the Faith, 1919), available 
at http:/ /www.poeticexpressions.co.uk/POEMS/Death%20is%20nothing%20at 
%20all%20-%20Canon%20Henry%20Scott-Holland.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
70. Many medieval poems included the phrase "Timor mortis conturbat me" 
("The fear of death distresses me"). The phrase comes from a responsory of the 
Catholic Office of the Dead in the third Nocturn of Matins. See Richard L. Greene, 
A Middle English "Timor Mortis" Poem, 28 MODERN LANGUAGE REV. 234, 234-38 
(1933). The Book of Psalms contains a plea for more time before the singer con­
fronts his death: "Hear my prayer, 0 Lord, and give ear unto my cry; hold not thy 
peace at my tears: for I am a stranger with thee, and a sojourner, as all my fathers 
were. 0 spare me, that I may recover strength, before I go hence, and be no more." 
Psalm 39:12-13 (King James). 
71. See Timothy P. Daaleman & Larry VandeCreek, Placing Religion and Spirit­
uality in End-of-Life Care, 284 JAMA 2514, 2514 (2000) (noting that the research into 
this question has generated "controversial results"). 
72. See Andrea C. Phelps et al., Religious Coping and Use of Intensive Life­
Prolonging Care Near Death in Patients with Advanced Cancer, 301 JAMA 1140, 1144 
(2009) (concluding that high levels of religious coping were strongly associated 
with a preference for intensive life-prolonging care at the end of life, including 
ventilation and resuscitation). The authors of the study were unable to explain the 
association between religiousness and the preference for aggressive care at the end 
of life. Id. at 1141. The authors speculate that perhaps these preferences arise from 
a sense that the sanctity of life requires all available efforts to prolong it and that 
suffering at death furthers a religious purpose. Id. at 1145. 
73. PETER D. HEINEGG, MORTALISM: READINGS ON THE MEANING OF LIFE 10 
(2003). 
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individual to determine how to live life well and thus reconcile herself 
to mortality. 
Unlike the rest of the animals, we are conscious of our mortality. 
Our superiority in this regard brings with it fear of death. Philoso­
pher Ernst Becker has captured the paradox quite elegantly: "Man is 
literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid unique­
ness in that he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he 
goes back into the ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to 
rot and disappear forever."74 As Becker observes, this "existential du­
alism makes an impossible situation, an excruciating dilemma."75 
Thus, man resorts to a form of "blind obliviousness with social games, 
psychological tricks, personal preoccupations so far removed from the 
reality of his situation that they are forms of madness."76 Much of 
how some individuals occupy their days serves either to deny that 
death is real or to somehow make its reality, when unavoidably 
glimpsed, more palatable.77 
These individual, intimately personal struggles are reinforced at 
a societal level in a variety of ways. For one, the conflict between the 
conservative, pro-life religious movement and our rule of law's fun­
damental respect for individual autonomy has devolved into an ex­
tremely polarizing conflict between faith and science. In recent years, 
the United States has seen political and religious conservatives inten­
tionally reject and undermine meaningful discussion about end of life 
care in favor of appealing to their base with superficial or false and 
misleading characterizations of issues.78 Sarah Palin's fear-monger 
rhetoric about government-sponsored "death panels" provides a 
74. ERNST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 26 (1973). 
75. Id. at 27. 
76. Id. 
77. Philosopher S0ren Kierkegaard' s concept of busyness seems to explain 
quite a lot of what we do to avoid thinking about difficult truths. See S0REN 
K!ERKEGAARD, PURITY OF HEART Is TO WILL ONE THING 108 (1847) ("But the reason 
may need to be explained ... why, in the press of busyness, there is neither time 
nor quiet to win the transparency that is indispensable if a man is to come to un­
derstand himself .... Nay, the press of busyness into which one steadily enters 
further and further, and the noise in which the truth continually slips more and 
more into oblivion, and the mass of connections, stimuli, and hindrances, these 
make it ever more impossible for one to win any deeper knowledge of himself."). 
78. Cf Rudy Ruiz, Commentary, Open Your Minds, America, CNN.COM (Sept. 
3, 2009), http: I I articles.cnn.com/2009-09-03 /politics/ ruiz.closed.minds_l_health­
care-listening-labels?_s=PM:POLITICS (suggesting that, with the health care de­
bate, we should be listening to differing opinions and acknowledge that changing 
one's mind in the face of new information is not a character flaw). 
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memorable example?9 These sorts of careless and ill-advised pro­
nouncements frustrate any reasonable attempts to engage in careful 
discussion and necessary debate about ethically complex end of life 
. 80Issues. 
In a different realm, cultural portrayals of older people in this 
society further exacerbate feelings of ambivalence about aging. As the 
average life span lengthens, we hear phrases like "fifty is the new thir­
ty" and advertisements for "adult communities" (no longer "retire­
ment communities" or "elder housing") depict smiling, vigorous, 
nimble people playing golf and tennis.81 As a society, we also deny 
the reality of aging and death by celebrating youth and physical per­
fection and by seeking it for ourselves.82 We cut, plump, inject with 
79. See Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK 
(Aug. 7, 2009,3:25 PM), http:/ /www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=l13851 
103434 ("The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby 
with Down Syndrome will have to stand in front of Obama's 'death panel' so his 
bureaucrats can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their 'level of produc­
tivity in society,' whether they are worthy of health care."). Palin's statement ac­
tually referred to a proposal in President Obama's health care reform legislation to 
provide Medicare beneficiaries with optional and free counseling on end of life de­
cision making, including the option of making an advance directive to announce 
the individual's preferences about life supportive care. See Michelle Andrews, Ra­
ther Than Creating 'Death Panels,' New Law Adds to End-of-Life Options, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 7, 2010, at HE5 (explaining that, in the wake of the outcry, legislators aban­
doned the provision). The damage created by these lies (a very effective, though 
mad, form of busyness) was significant. In a Kaiser Family Foundation poll of 
Medicare-eligible senior citizens, more than one-third believed that the health re­
form bill would allow government panels to make decisions about end of life care 
for Medicare recipients. See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Ju­
ly 2010), www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/8084.cfm?RenderForPrint=1. 
80. Conflict about the sanctity of life may have more to do with political pow­
er and profiteering or with psychological displacement than any genuine concern 
about the merits of the arguments. It is, at least in part, another distraction from 
mortality, another manifestation of Kierkegaard's busyness. 
81. Cf Mark D. Bauer, "Peter Pan" as Public Policy: Should Fifty-Five-Plus Age­
Restricted Communities Continue to be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws and Substantive 
Federal Regulation?, 21 ELDER L.J. 33, 36,42-43 (2013) (describing the amenities and 
shortcomings of 55+ communities). 
82. We are bombarded constantly with images and promises of youth and 
rejuvenation. Airline magazine advertisements, for example, tout pills and hor­
mone treatments for all sorts of ills associated with aging: a "brain oxygen­
boosting miracle energizes mind, mood and memory ... sharpens focus, clears 
away brain fog, erases 15 years of lost memory power!"; an exhortation to "choose 
life, grow young with HGH" (human growth hormone); and another program that 
promises that its "balanced combination of nutrition, exercise and hormone opti­
mization" will "reverse[] the signs and symptoms of aging" including "decreased 
risk of age-related disease ... increased energy, increased sex drive, sharper think­
ing." (Copies on file with author); see also Thomas H. Perls et al., Provision or Dis­
tribution of Growth Hormone for "Antiaging," 294 JAMA 2086, 2086 (2005) (describ­
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muscle-paralyzing toxins and much more in the pursuit of physical 
perfection and perpetual youth. 83 As one commentator wryly ob­
served, "[o]nce regarded as an unyielding, utterly unforgiving, brute 
feature of existence, death is increasingly portrayed as a bad lifestyle 
option."84 
In the tradition of the best hucksters selling wonder potions and 
elixirs on the American frontier, some researchers now talk of dou­
bling the human life span, even of a "cure for death,"85 and of aging as 
a "disease" that should be "treated."86 Research is underway to elim­
inate error rate in cell division at the molecular level in order to post­
pone death or evade it altogether.87 Although commentators have el­
oquently questioned the research imperative and its unintended 
consequences,88 so-called "cures for death," and strategies to reduce 
ing the proliferation of websites marketing HGH and commenting on the multi­
million dollar and growing "antiaging" industry). 
83. See LAURIE ESSIG, AMERICAN PLASTIC: BOOB JOBS, CREDIT CARDS, AND OUR 
QUEST FOR PERFECTION, at xiii, 84 (2010) (noting that the rate of plastic surgery has 
increased by 465% in the past decade and discussing the American woman's battle 
against "ordinary ugliness" with plastic surgery and the underlying causes for 
failure to accept the effects of aging's normal wear and tear on the body such as 
"stretch marks, cellulite, wrinkles, the downward pull of gravity ...."). 
84. Leigh Turner, Antiaging, 292 JAMA 2155, 2155 (2004). 
85. Closing in on the Cure for Death, FIGHT AGING! (Sept. 2, 2003), http:/ I 
www.fightaging.org/ archives/2003 I 09 I closing-in-on-the-cure-for-death. 
php; see also Penni Crabtree, Fountain of Youth with Just a Shot in the Arm?, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 25, 2005, at Al (describing the Institute's claims and 
explaining that mainstream science has debunked anti-aging claims as "huckster­
ism" that offers little or no benefit but poses potentially serious health risks). 
86. See Daniel Callahan, Death and the Research Imperative, 342 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 654, 654-55 (2000) (quoting William Haseltine, then CEO of Human Genome 
Sciences as saying that "[d]eath is a series of preventable diseases" and arguing 
that research "should not, even implicitly, have eradication of death as its goal" 
because it supplants emphasis on the importance of relieving suffering at the end 
of life and it "promotes the idea among the public and physicians that death repre­
sents a failure of medicine."). 
87. See, e.g., Mariela Jaskelioff et al., Telomerase Reactivation Reverses Tissue De­
generation in Aged Telomerase-Deficient Mice, 469 NATURE 102, 104 (2010) (conclud­
ing, astonishingly, that correcting degeneration of the telomeres at the ends of 
mouse chromosomes, which are responsible for mutations during cell division, not 
only halted aging in mice but also reversed previous age-related degeneration of 
the brain). Similar research is supported by the Methusaleh Foundation, which 
sponsors a competition for researchers to develop technologies that break the 
world record for mouse longevity and mouse rejuvenation. See METHUSALEH 
FOUNDATION, www.mprize.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
88. 	 As Daniel Callahan succinctly explains, 
Medical technology seems to know no boundaries because it is hard 
to say just what bodily failings and lethal threats we should be willing 
to accept. The medical research agenda n:ow goes after all lethal dis­
eases, but it also goes after human enhancements and wish fulfill­
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morbidity in old age continue with little regard for the cultural conse­
quences of the utterly distorted and absurd message it sends. This 
quest for a fountain of youth denies the reality of mortality, not to 
mention the fact that more days or years of life do not necessarily 
guarantee more quality of life or more happiness. 
Paradoxically, alongside this anti-aging research juggernaut, we 
have at the same time made an "industry" of death and dying. In the 
United States and elsewhere, there are multitudes of death memoirs 
and manuals, sharing websites and blogs, on the experience and pro­
cess of terminal illness. Death memoirs are nothing new, but they ap­
pear to have multiplied in recent decades. 89 Some of these memoirs 
contemplate what it means to be a patient captive to medicine and 
disease, or describe a brave battle and its consequent appreciation of 
life.90 Others explain the experience of terminal illness as casting the 
sufferer into the role of an outsider, no longer a member of society in 
the usual sense. 91 The modern tendency to share one's innermost 
thoughts and experiences of illness via blogs and specialized social 
networks seems paradoxical when juxtaposed with the unwillingness 
ment. Death itself is made to seem an accidental, contingent event. 
Why do we now die? Not because of the inherent finitude of the hu­
man body, as most people thought for most of human history. We 
die, it is said, because we engage in unhealthy lifestyles, or because 
research has not yet found a cure for our diseases. 
Daniel Callahan, Too Much of a Good Thing: How Splendid Technologies Can Go 
Wrong, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 21. 
89. The German language even has a compound noun for such books­
"Krebsbiichlein" or, roughly translated, "little cancer book." 
90. See, e.g., EDWARD E. ROSENBAUM, A TASTE OF MY OWN MEDICINE (1988); 
JOHN GUNTHER, DEATH BE NOT PROUD (1949) (telling the story of the author's 
son's struggle with a brain tumor and his death at age seventeen). 
91. See PETER NOLL, IN THE FACE OF DEATH 3-5 (Hans Noll, trans., 1984). Pe­
ter Noll's book provides an intriguing and ultimately disturbing explanation of 
how he sees his outsider role as a logical continuation of what he has done all his 
life. In it, he explains his refusal of aggressive treatment for his cancer, not for re­
ligious reasons (although his father was a cleric) but for reasons of individual hu­
manity and autonomy, a carefully considered decision to choose what is right and 
correct for himself, rather than to take any kind of public stance on end of life care. 
The author, upon deciding to refuse smgery to resect his bladder cancer, com­
ments that 
[n]aturally it is appropriate to show a patient who chooses metastasis 
instead of the technological prolongation of death a certain admira­
tion, even though, strictly speaking, he hardly deserves it, for he real­
ly has only a choice between two evils, and it is almost pmely a ques­
tion of taste as to which he prefers. 
Id. at3-4. 
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to engage in advance care planning or to acknowledge and accept ag­
ing and the prospect of death. 
IV. 	The Role of Law in Confronting Death 
So what, if anything, does all of this have to do with law? The 
short answer: despite the multiplicity of state and federal statutes and 
judicial decisions that address end of life decision making, not much. 
The problem we confront runs much deeper than what any law can 
solve. Our culture discourages self-examination as a part of the pro­
cess of preparing for dying and death. We unconsciously (or some­
times deliberately) decide not to make choices that are ours to make. 
Yet, our legal rights regarding end of life decision making only have 
their fullest impact and meaning if we confront end of life issues long 
before a crisis of trauma or illness forces the issue. 
Although advance directives are only occasionally consulted in 
making treatment decisions for patients who have lost decisional ca­
pacity, the process of thinking about the issues to which a good ad­
vance directive demands attention is inherently valuable, not only as 
an opportunity to exercise some choice over the manner of one's death 
but also as a means of enhancing life. The process itself-thinking 
about an advance directive, revising it, and discussing it with physi­
cian and family-presents an opportunity for each individual to reori­
ent himself individually to goals and ways of living that have mean­
ing on a very personal level. Ultimately, advance directives are about 
living, not dying. 
In addition to the reforms discussed above that focus on regular­
izing the process of making advance directives and promoting inter­
state recognition, states should publicize the purposes and availability 
of these documents and should promote them as part of the daily 
business of being a citizen of the state. Although the idea of mandat­
ing advance directives raises serious concerns about privacy and au­
tonomy, there seems no reason to discourage states from promoting 
the execution of these documents. Just as we ask people to indicate 
their willingness to be organ donors on their driving licenses, general 
practitioners could similarly make an annual inquiry about memorial­
izing end of life preferences, though physicians already struggle to 
care for patients during the limited time allocated for an annual exam. 
Unfortunately, the design of our health care system does not foster 
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long-term relationships between physicians and patients. 92 Those in­
dividuals who are fortunate enough to have health insurance still are 
likely to change general practitioners fairly frequently, particularly 
when they change employmene3 When serious illness occurs, spe­
cialists become involved in care, often omitting to include general 
practitioners in the conversation or to maintain a seamless exchange 
of information among themselves. 
States also should educate their citizens about the value of peri­
odic review and encourage individuals to revisit their choices as their 
values, experiences, and circumstances change.
94 
States might even 
consider including information about end of life issues and end of life 
rights in their public school health curricula. Teaching young adults 
about these issues (along with safe sexual practices and good nutri­
tion) would likely help to improve their comfort level with thinking 
about and discussing such matters throughout their lives. Over time, 
education about advance care planning and regularizing inquiries and 
updates could make advance directives as natural a part of citizenship 
as obtaining vehicle registration stickers or paying property taxes 
(and, at least superficially, far less burdensome than either of these). 
Still, it seems likely that many people, perhaps the vast majority, 
would choose to postpone addressing end of life issues, perhaps for 
some of the same reasons that people refuse to consider organ dona­
tion in the face of concerted government action to encourage it.95 All 
92. Cf Quill, supra note 10, at 2504 (quoting a clinician who felt that she had 
"lost [her patient] in the system" after he was transferred to a long-term care facili­
ty where he would likely die, rather than dying at home with hospice, where she 
could be part of the ending). 
93. Most insured individuals in the United States outside of the Medicare 
population receive their health insurance as an employee benefit. See BARRY R. 
FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 347 n.1 
(6th ed. 2008); cf Ann S. O'Malley et al., Coordination of Care by Primary Care Prac­
tices: Strategies, Lessons and Implications, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM 
CHANGE, Apr. 2009, at 1, 3, available at http:/ /www.hschange.com/CONTENT/ 
1058/. 
94. At least a few states have chosen to put some resources into education. 
For example, in 2007 New York created a program to educate the public about the 
need for advance directives and health care proxies. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 
207 (Consol. 2012); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (2012) (requiring 
that if a health care provider diagnoses a patient with a terminal condition, the 
provider must provide the patient with information regarding end of life options); 
VT. STAT. ANN. 18 § 1871 (2012, Westlaw through the laws of the Adjourned Ses­
sion on the 2011-2012 Vermont General Assembly) (same). 
95. Concerns about making organ documents of gift and concerns about mak­
ing advance directives sometimes arise from the misperception that physicians 
will make less effort to preserve the lives of potential organ donors or those who 
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of these suggested reforms to the law only go part of the way to ad­
dressing the inevitable struggle with end of life issues. The broader, 
unanswered question is what else, outside of the legal system, can en­
courage individuals to address these questions on a personal level be­
fore the critical moment arrives? Autonomy does not have much 
meaning without the courage and foresight to think about what is im­
portant to us as individuals-whether it is achieving the longest life 
possible, minimizing life with disability, or perhaps tolerating disabil­
ity so long as cognitive abilities remain unimpaired-and to memori­
alize these preferences through serious conversations with family 
members or via a written document. Of course, there is also the op­
tion to ignore reality and to pretend that we are immortal. This denial 
injures not only ourselves but also those around us by raising the risk 
of conflicts within families or between families and health care pro­
viders and by potentially imposing the burden of deciding on a family 
member. 
From the perspective of health care providers, these conversa­
tions are also difficult. Physicians have long struggled with feelings 
of powerlessness, grief, or failure when patients die.96 Educating phy­
sicians and medical students about effective patient communication 
can foster participatory decision making and meaningful conversa­
tion. The medical literature suggests that the goal of quality commu­
nication has received more attention recently, though time constraints 
and individual predispositions probably limit it overall.97 Discussions 
about the imminence of death and the patient's preferences regarding 
indicate preferences to refuse life-sustaining treatment. See generally Symposium, 
Precious Commodities: The Supply & Demand of Body Parts, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 793 
(2006). 
96. See R. S. Kane, The Defeat of Aging Versus the Importance of Death, 44 J. AM. 
GERIATRIC Soc. 321, 321-22 (1996); Diane E. Meier et al., The Inner Life of Physicians 
and Care of the Seriously Ill, 286 JAMA 3007, 3007-08 (2001) (encouraging physicians 
to be self-aware, to acknowledge their emotions as they care for dying patients in 
order to improve quality of care, and to guard the physician's own well-being). 
97. See Ronald M. Epstein et al., Communicating Evidence for Participatory Deci­
sion Making, 291 JAMA 2359, 2362 (2004) (reviewing the literature to identify re­
search that guides physicians in communicating with their patients about end of 
life choices and recommending five communication steps to facilitate good discus­
sion between physician and patient); Dale G. Larson & Daniel R. Tobin, End-of-Life 
Conversations: Evolving Practice and Theory, 284 JAMA 1573, 1576-77 (2000) (urging 
that end of life conversations become a routine part of health care and that ad­
vance care planning function as a key aspect of these discussions); Quill, supra note 
10, at 2503 (explaining that "[t]imely, sensitive discussions with seriously ill pa­
tients regarding medical, psychosocial, and spiritual needs at the end of life are 
both an obligation of and privilege for every physician."). 
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care are too frequently delayed.98 Perhaps most significantly, health 
care providers express frustration and even anguish that they do not 
have the time to spend with patients to address their patients' feelings 
of shock, depression, or helplessness.99 Thus, encouraging physicians 
to talk with patients (even younger adult patients) about end of life 
matters can help to make this process a routine aspect of general and 
preventive health care and, in fact, is explicitly encouraged by the 
American Medical Association. 100 Somewhat paradoxically, however, 
physicians appear resistant to such recommendations.101 
Moreover, medical education should teach new physicians clear­
ly and unequivocally that medical care is not necessarily always about 
prolonging life. The common training of physicians focuses on 
fighting disease, remaining detached, continuing to search for a solu­
tion to a problem, but perhaps at the cost of also losing sight of the pa­
98. See Quill, supra note 10, at 2503-04 (providing a list of clinical indications 
for discussing end of life care, including imminent death, talk about wanting to 
die, inquiries about hospice, recent hospitalization for severe progressive illness, 
severe suffering, discussing prognosis, discussing treatment with low probability 
of success, discussing hopes and fears, and in cases where the physician would not 
be surprised if the patient died within six to twelve months). These indications for 
initiating end of life discussions, while useful, are primarily reactive to imminent 
death, not proactive in any way that would assist a person with coming to terms 
with mortality while still healthy. 
99. See Charles J. Sabatino, Reflections on the Meaning of Care, 6 NURSING 
ETHICS 374, 374-76 (1999) (explaining that the dramatic growth of technologies in 
medical care creates a danger "that care will lose its primary focus on the well­
being of the whole person"). 
100. As one commentator has noted, "discussing palliative care issues while 
disease-remitting treatments are continued without creating a perception of aban­
donment requires the utmost empathy and skill." See Larson & Tobin, supra note 
97, at 1575. Why not discuss while the patient is well, as part of primary and pre­
ventive care? In fact, these authors recommend precisely that. See id. at 1576. En­
couraging patients to discuss preferences is already happening, but does not ap­
pear to have had widespread effect. See Opinion 8.081 - Surrogate Decision Making, 
AM. MED. Ass'N, http:/ /www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/ 
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion8081.page (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) 
("Physicians should encourage their patients to document their treatment prefer­
ences or to appoint a health care proxy with whom they can discuss their values 
regarding health care and treatment in advance. Because documented advance 
directives are often not available in emergency situations, physicians should em­
phasize to patients the importance of discussing treatment preferences with indi­
viduals who are likely to act as their surrogates."). 
101. See Nancy L. Keating et al., Physician Factors Associated With Discussions 
About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER 998, 1001 (2010) (concluding that most physi­
cians surveyed indicated that they would not discuss end of life decisions and 
choices with terminally ill patients until they exhibited symptoms or there are no 
remaining treatments available). 
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tient and her goals as an individual. 102 By reorienting the notion of 
caring to include the possibility of stopping therapeutic care and fo­
cusing on the alleviation of suffering, young physicians in training can 
learn to rein in their technological imperative impulses and offer the 
patient other sorts of care to ease the dying process. 103 Unfortunately, 
physicians who care for dying patients quite frequently experience re­
sistance from patients' families or their own colleagues when they 
recommend withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care-such 
recommendations often are referred to as "euthanasia," "killing," or 
"murder."104 
This society has endorsed the idea that it is acceptable, even de­
sirable, to suppress the fear of death rather than confronting it, to take 
massive measures to fight death, even to deny its inevitability. The 
instinctive desire of physicians, patients, and families to "do every­
thing possible" comports with this broader cultural attitude. This 
perspective perpetuates the belief that maximal utilization of life­
prolonging measures constitutes "good health care."105 Although the 
attitude among health care providers is shifting, not long ago it was 
common to interpret good care as demanding every available, rele­
vant treatment. 106 Now, more voices are speaking against the uncriti­
102. See generally Symposium, Patient-Centered Law and Ethics, 45 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1427 (2010) (contaiillng multiple articles that address the value of provid­
ing medical care that places the individual patient at the center of health care de­
livery, rather than letting insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, or 
even medical organizations drive). 
103. It is important to acknowledge at this point the flaws in the palliative and 
hospice system that impact the quality of end of life care, particularly the problems 
of access and late referrals, although this matter falls outside the scope of this Arti­
cle. In this regard, as with communication with patients about their end of life 
preferences, medicine is making significant progress. 
104. See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Prevalence of Formal Accusations of Murder 
and Euthanasia Against Physicians, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 334, 334-39 (2012) (finding 
that more than half of physicians surveyed had their recommendations character­
ized as euthanasia, murder, or killing within the previous five years and that 4% of 
physicians surveyed reported being formally investigated for hastening a patient's 
death when using aggressive pain management techniques and discontinuing ven­
tilator support). 
105. Cf. Albert R. Jonsen, The God Squad and the Origins of Transplantation Ethics 
and Policy, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 238, 239 (2007) ("The problem that looms behind 
transplantation medicine is the incessant desire, or rather, demand, that life must 
be salvaged at all costs."). 
106. See id. at 377 (adding that it is not unusual to "offer a great deal of expen­
sive care trying to put off the inevitability of death, even when it may be in vain to 
continue doing so."). 
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cal presumption in favor of utilizing medical teclmology simply be­
cause it is available.107 
V. Conclusion 
There is a fundamental difference between acknowledging futile 
treatment and advocating euthanasia, abandoning effective medical 
treatments for serious illness, or any other dire interpretation that 
alarmists might ascribe to the reflections on law and dying in this es­
say. It is difficult to imagine a downside to educating individuals 
about their rights and choices, including their right to refuse unwant­
ed medical treatment. It is also essential to ensure that choices really 
do exist and that individual preference is respected, the more so in 
situations where care givers, institutions, family members, and even 
politicians or religious leaders are attempting to hijack individual 
choice. Thinking about and discussing end of life choices explicitly 
while there is still healthy life ahead can reduce the incidence of end 
of life conflicts and family anguish about stopping treatment and fos­
ter a culture of respect for individual choice. Reforming the law rep­
resents only a small step towards helping individuals make peace 
with death. Meanwhile, modern medicine, longer life spans, and life­
sustaining teclmology make it possible to postpone end of life deci­
sion-making. 
Acknowledging and embracing mortality is not a tragedy-it is a 
life-long opportunity. It is impossible to develop any collective ma­
joritarian default position on how to deal with death on an individual 
level. When an individual decides for herself how to live right, and 
moves forward with the assurance that she is living well, she can let 
go of the fear of death. Making peace with how one lives-in prepa­
ration for how one dies-should be an ongoing process, an opportuni­
107. As Daniel Callahan has so ably argued, medical research should focus on 
reducing morbidity in the final years of life and assuring that people receive excel­
lent care as they die in order to reduce suffering. Daniel Callahan, supra note 86, at 
655-56; see also DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING 
SOCIETY 53-58 (1987); DANIEL CALLAHAN, TAMING THE BELOVED BEAST 152-55 
(2009) (arguing that "death itself, part of our biological nature, ought not to be 
seen as the primary target for health care, particularly when most of us now have 
the chance to live a full life" and observing that, paradoxically, as our society has 
become healthier, we have begun to worry more about health and to spend more 
technological resources on maintaining it); see also James F. Fries, Aging, Natural 
Death, and the Compression of Morbidity, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 130, 130-31 (1980) 
(discussing the goal of "[e]xtension of adult vigor far into a fixed life span [in order 
to] compress[] the period of senescence near the end of life."). 
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ty to be seized rather than postponed. This is not a novel observation. 
H.L. Mencken, in a letter to the woman whom he later married, ar­
gued that it is better to acknowledge the sorrows of life (including the 
inevitability of death) in order to savor its joys. Mencken advocates 
cynicism as "the most comforting of philosophies. You will get over 
your present difficulties only to run into something worse, and so on, 
until the last sad scene. Make up your mind to it-and then make the 
best of it. . . . Biological necessities keep us going. It is the feeling of 
exerting effort that exhilarates us, as a grasshopper is exhilarated by 
jumping. A hard job, full of impediments, is thus more satisfying than 
. b "108an easy JO . 
Obviously, there are no simple solutions to the problems de­
scribed here. Perhaps, at a societal level, these problems are insuper­
able. Individuals can, however, take responsibility for that moment 
which, when it comes, is ours alone to face. 109 In this sense, even ad­
vance care planning creates a false sense of control over the inevitabil­
ity of death, because it addresses (and more often in theory than in 
practice) the externalities of dying, not the feelings of the individual 
approaching death. Finding ways to live beyond the daily activities 
necessary to sustain our bodies, and beyond simply seeking distrac­
tion, provides a sense of purpose. Much of what we experience at the 
end of our lives is within our exclusive control-our inner lives re­
main ours alone. As for our outer lives-specifically our bodies and 
what we may suffer-taking some control over this aspect of dying 
requires an initial willingness to confront what lies within, and to 
make use of the law when it promotes our interests and those of the 
ones we love. 
108. Letter from H.L. Mencken to Sara P. Haardt (later his wife) while she was 
in a sanatorium receiving treatment for tuberculosis; quoted in Jacob A. Stein, A 
Book on the Bus, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Sept. 2008, http:/ /www.dcbar.org/for 
_lawyers I resources I publicationsI washington_lawyerI september_2008 I spectator 
.cfm. 
109. In the words of Ivan Illich, "[t]he ordinary person suffers from the inabil­
ity to die .... Today, it is not sophisticated terminal treatment but lifelong training 
in misplaced concreteness that is the major obstacle to a bittersweet acceptance of 
our precarious existence and subsequent readiness to prepare for our own death." 
lllich, supra note 1, at 1653. 
